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Abstract
The choice of either the rate of monetary growth or the nominal interest rate as the in-
strument controlled by monetary authorities has both positive and normative implications
for economic performance. We reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the
monetary policy instrument in a dynamic general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous
growth in which a fraction of productive government spending is Þnanced by means of issuing
currency. When we evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments attending to
the ßuctuations of endogenous variables, we Þnd that the inßation rate is less volatile un-
der nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning the ßuctuations of consumption and of the
growth rate, both monetary policy instruments lead to statistically equivalent volatilities.
Finally, we show that none of these two targeting procedures displays unambiguously higher
welfare levels.
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1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that the central bank operating procedures could aﬀect the ßuctuations
of macroeconomic variables. Monetary authorities may control either monetary aggregates or
nominal interest rates, but not both independently. Therefore, a monetary authority should
decide whether to use the growth rate of the money supply or the nominal interest rate as the
policy instrument, taking into account that one monetary policy instrument could lead to a
superior performance than the other. In this paper we want to reexamine some of the issues
related to the choice of the monetary policy instrument in a general equilibrium model exhibiting
endogenous growth, where the productive government spending is partially Þnanced by means
of currency printing. We evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments from the
point of view of both ßuctuations of endogenous variables and welfare.
As it was already pointed out by Poole (1970) in an IS-LM framework, the problem of Þnding
the optimal policy instrument is irrelevant when we are dealing with a non-stochastic economy.
The question becomes however relevant under uncertainty. Poole evaluated the performance
of both instruments by just looking at output ßuctuations. He found that, when the origin of
disturbances comes mainly from money demand shocks, to target the nominal interest rate is
the best policy in terms of output stabilization, whereas to target the rate of monetary growth
is the most stabilizing policy when the origin of disturbances comes mainly from real shocks.
Concerning price ßuctuations, he recommends nominal interest rate targeting as a more price
stabilizing policy.
After Pooles contribution the question of the optimal choice of the monetary policy in-
struments has been analyzed by several authors through more sophisticated frameworks. For
example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) consider a cash-in-advance model with portfolio rigidity
in the households cash-saving choice, and Þnd that interest rate targeting is the instrument
that outperforms monetary aggregate targeting in terms of welfare even if the former delivers
more volatile output. Collard, Dellas and Ertz (1998) evaluate the two targeting procedures in
a growth model with labor augmenting technological progress, and consider the eﬀects of tech-
nology, money demand, and Þscal shocks. They conclude that nominal interest rate targeting
results in higher welfare and lower volatility of both output and inßation rate regardless of the
origin of the shocks generating the disturbances. Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) study the eﬀect
of the choice of the monetary policy instrument on the level of the risk premium in a cash-in-
advance economy without capital where labor contracts induce rigidities. They Þnd that, under
nominal interest rate targeting, the average level of the real interest rate is higher and prices
are less volatile. Nevertheless, they conclude that it is not clear which policy performs better in
terms of welfare.
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In this paper we deal with an endogenous growth model in which two kinds of shocks are
present: technology and money demand shocks. Technology shocks enter directly into the
production function. Money demand shocks are introduced in the form of a modiÞed cash-in-
advance constraint in the spirit of Woodford (1991). We evaluate the inßuence of both shocks
on the rate of economic growth, on the inßation rate, and on consumption when the monetary
authority follows either monetary aggregate targeting or nominal interest rate targeting.
We consider a production function with government spending like in Barro (1990). Barro
assumes in his model that government spending is entirely Þnanced by means of a ßat rate
income tax, while Blackburn and Hung (1996) assume instead that the government Þnances
its spending through seignorage, that is, by printing money. The latter assumption allows the
model to create a new link between monetary shocks and output, since the inßationary revenues
obtained by the government are transformed into productive spending. However, we will assume
that the government obtains revenues both from taxes and from seignorage. If the revenues from
income taxes were disregarded, the model would display unrealistic values both of the money
growth rate and of the nominal interest rate. Therefore, we combine both forms of Þnancing as in
Palivos and Yip (1995). Finally, let us mention that many countries subject to large tax evasion
have used seignorage to obtain easy inßationary revenues (see Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992
and 1995).
When we evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments from the point of view
of ßuctuations of endogenous variables, we Þnd that the inßation rate is less volatile under
nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning the ßuctuations of consumption and of the growth
rate, both monetary policy instruments lead to statistically equivalent volatilities. Considering
the welfare implications, none of the two targeting procedures gives rise to unambiguously higher
welfare levels. Even if recently many central banks have been reoriented to nominal interest rate
targeting, our analysis suggests that this will not aﬀect neither welfare nor economic stability
in terms of consumption and of growth rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. We
present the solution technique and calibrate the model in section 3. We perform the steady state
analysis for an non-stochastic economy in section 4. The evaluation of both targeting procedures
in a stochastic setup is presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
2.1. The Households
Let us consider an economy populated by inÞnitely lived identical households. The preferences
of a representative household at time t are given by the following utility function deÞned over
the random stream of consumption {cj}∞j=t:
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! , (2.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and the parameter θ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
The sequence of events within each period is the following:
1) Individuals enter a given period t with a certain amount of monetary balances Mt and of
real assets zt.
2) Individuals learn the state of the economy (At, st) in the current period, where At is a
technology shock and st is a money demand shock. We assume that the two shocks are mutually
independent.
3) Individuals supply inelastically a unit of labor and production takes place.
4) Individuals receive their real income in the form of a wage wt and a return to asset holdings
rtzt.
5) Income is taxed by the government at the rate τt.
6) The goods market opens and individuals purchase consumption using their money balances
and a fraction of their after-tax income.
7) The Þnancial market opens and agents choose both their nominal money holdings Mt+1
and their assets holdings zt+1 for period t+ 1.
The budget constraint for period t is thus the following:
ct + (zt+1 − zt) + Mt+1 −Mt
pt
≤ (1− τt) [wt + rtzt] . (2.2)
In strict cash-in-advance models with uncertainty and a single consumption good, consumers
must purchase such a good by using only currency, and the income earned in the current period
cannot be converted into money until the next Þnancial exchange. However, following Woodford
(1991), we will assume here that a fraction of the t period after-tax income can be used for
current period purchases. Moreover, like in Canzoneri and Dellas (1998), we allow this fraction
to ßuctuate randomly. Therefore, the cash-in-advance constraint becomes
ct ≤ Mt
pt
+ st(1− τt) [wt + rtzt] , (2.3)
where st is the money demand shock. Money demand shocks are assumed to be lognormally
distributed and to follow an autoregressive process,
ln st+1 = (1− ρs) ln s¯+ ρs ln st + εs,t+1,
where ρs ∈ (0, 1) , ln s¯ is the unconditional expected value of the logarithm of the money demand
shock, and the variables εs,t are identically and independently distributed with εs,t ∼ N(0,σ2s).1
1Note that E (ln st) = ln s¯t, whereas the conditional expectation is Et (ln st+1) = (1 − ρs) ln s¯t + ρs ln st.
Therefore, s¯t = exp [E (ln st)] .
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The shock st can be viewed as a measure of the eﬃciency of the payment system. Depending on
both the after-tax income (1 − τt) [wt + rtzt] and the realization of the shock st in the current
period, agents know how severe is their cash-in-advance constraint. If we set st = 0 for all t,
we would obtain the cash-in-advance constraint usually found in standard monetary models. In
this case, only the currency held at the end of the previous Þnancial exchange could be used to
purchase goods. The more general cash-in-advance constraint (2.3) allows a fraction st of the
after-tax income in period t to be spent immediately. Thus, if the value of st is high, then the
cash-in-advance constraint would not be so tight. Clearly, a high value of st means that less
income has to be converted into a non-interest bearing asset (money) in order to get a given
level of consumption. Thus a higher value of st corresponds to a more eﬃcient payment system
and, it is obviously associated with a higher velocity of money.
A representative household chooses the stochastic vector sequence {ct,Mt+1, zt+1}∞t=1 in order
to maximize the expected discounted sum of instantaneous utilities (2.1) subject to the budget
constraint (2.2) and the cash in advance constraint (2.3).
2.2. The Firms
In this economy there are identical Þrms, and each of them produces the single good of this
economy according to the technology represented by the gross production function
yt = Atk
α
t g
1−α
t , (2.4)
where yt is the output per worker, At is a random variable that represents the technology shock,
kt is the stock of capital per worker, gt is the government expenditure per capita and α ∈ (0, 1)
is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. Our formulation follows thus that of Barro
(1990), according to which the ßow of government spending raises the factors productivity. The
rate of depreciation of private capital is δ. Technology shocks are also assumed to be lognormally
distributed and to follow an autoregressive process,
lnAt+1 = (1− ρA) ln A¯+ ρA lnAt + εA,t+1,
where ρA ∈ (0, 1), ln A¯ is the unconditional expected value of the logarithm of the technology
shock, and the variables εA,t are identically and independently distributed with εA,t ∼ N(0,σ2A).
We normalize the number of Þrms so that there is a Þrm per consumer. Firms do not pay any
fee for the use of public services associated with the ßow of government spending. Consumers
lend both capital and labor to the Þrms. Both the rental price rt of capital and the real wage
wt are set competitively so that Þrms end up getting zero proÞts in equilibrium. Therefore,
rt = αAtk
α−1
t g
1−α
t − δ (2.5)
and
wt = (1− α)Atkαt g1−αt . (2.6)
4
Obviously, in equilibrium kt = zt, and we obtain that the net income per capita turns out to be
equal to the net domestic product per capita,
wt + rtkt = Atk
α
t g
1−α
t − δkt. (2.7)
2.3. The Government
The government of this economy sets a public spending to GDP ratio and controls the values
of the monetary policy parameters. We will consider that the government spends a constant
fraction G of GDP in each period,
gt
yt
= G, (2.8)
for all t. Concerning how the monetary policy is conducted, government has at its disposal two
monetary instruments: it can regulate either the monetary aggregate or the nominal interest rate.
When the amount of money is targeted, the nominal interest rate is determined endogenously,
whereas when the nominal interest rate is used as the monetary policy instrument, it is the
quantity of money to be printed that accommodates the demand for monetary balances.
We assume that government expenditures are Þnanced by a ßat-rate income tax and by
printing money (seignorage). The tax rate on net income τt is endogenous and it is set in every
period so as to fulÞl the following government budget constraint:
gt = τt (yt − δkt) + Mt+1 −Mt
pt
, (2.9)
whereMt+1−Mt is the nominal money injected into the economy in period t. In order to Þnance
the ßow of its productive spending, the government borrows the amount gt per capita at the
beginning of period t. Immediately after production has taken place, the government pays some
of its spending by taxing income. Moreover, after consumption has taken place, money is issued
to Þnance the rest of the current period spending. The government does not pay interest on the
amount borrowed as both the spending and the corresponding payment occur within the same
period.
2.4. Equilibrium
Let λt and ηt be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint
(2.2) and the cash-in-advance constraint (2.3), respectively. Given the competitive nature of
our economy, the solution of the problem faced by a consumer is characterized by the following
equations, which are obtained from replacing the net income wt + rtzt by the net production
(see equation (2.7)), and by taking derivatives of the corresponding Lagrangian with respect to
consumption, money, and capital:
c−θt = λt + ηt, (2.10)
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λt
pt
= βEt
µ
λt+1 + ηt+1
pt+1
¶
, (2.11)
λt = βEt
Ã
λt+1
(
1 + (1− τt+1)
"
αAt+1
µ
gt+1
kt+1
¶1−α
− δ
#)!
+
βEt
Ã
ηt+1st+1(1− τt+1)
"
αAt+1
µ
gt+1
kt+1
¶1−α
− δ
#!
. (2.12)
Moreover, the following transversality condition must hold:
lim
j→∞Et
³
βt+jλt+jkt+j+1
´
= 0. (2.13)
The Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget and cash-in-advance constraints, λt and
ηt, can be interpreted as the marginal utility of wealth and the marginal utility of real balances,
respectively. The Þrst order condition on consumption (2.10) tells us that the existence of binding
liquidity constraint drives a wedge between the marginal utility of wealth and the marginal utility
of consumption, since wealth cannot be used instantaneously to buy consumption goods. The
left hand side of the Þrst order condition on nominal balances (2.11) can be interpreted as the
loss of utility due to the acquisition of an extra unit of money. At the margin this amount
must be equal to the value of the liquidity services provided by such a unit of money plus
the discounted expected utility increase due to capital gains resulting from price level changes.
Condition (2.12) combines the costs and expected gains of investing one marginal unit of wealth
into capital.
To deÞne the nominal interest rate it+1 from t to t+1, we follow Svensson (1985). Note that
if a nominal bond were available, the discounted expected utility of investing a monetary unit
in this bond would be
βEt
µ
λt+1(1 + it+1)
pt+1
¶
. (2.14)
The discounted expected utility of holding a monetary unit as cash at the end of period t is
βEt
µ
λt+1 + ηt+1
pt+1
¶
. (2.15)
By arbitrage, the expected marginal utilities (2.14) and (2.15) must be equated. Hence, taking
into account that the nominal interest it+1 is known at t, we have that
it+1 =
Et
µ
ηt+1
pt+1
¶
Et
µ
λt+1
pt+1
¶ . (2.16)
The nominal interest rate is thus the ratio between the expected marginal utility of the liquidity
services of money and the expected marginal utility of money wealth.
DeÞnition: Given the set of initial conditions k1, M1 and p0, an equilibrium is a vector of
stochastic processes {ct, kt+1,Mt+1, µt+1, it+1, pt+1, gt, τt}∞t=0 such that
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(a) The representative household is maximizing the discounted expected utility (2.1) subject
to the budget constraint (2.2) and the cash-in-advance constraint (2.3);
(b) Markets for goods and money clear in every period,
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + gt, (2.17)
where yt = Atk
α
t g
1−α
t , and
µt+1 =
Mt+1
Mt
; (2.18)
(c) The government budget constraint (2.9) holds and government spending satisÞes (2.8)
for an exogenously given real number G > 0;
(d) The following relationship between the growth rate of money supply µt+1 and the nominal
interest rate it+1 holds:
µt+1
1 + it+1
= βEt
µ
λt+1
λt
pt
pt+1
Mt+1
Mt
¶
; (2.19)
(e.1) If the government pegs the rate of monetary growth, then µt+1 = µ for t = 0, 1, ...,
where µ is exogenously given, or
(e.2) If the government pegs the nominal interest rate, then it+1 = i for t = 0, 1, ..., where i
is exogenously given.
Obviously, the asset market also clears in equilibrium, zt = kt, as follows from Walras law.
Equation (2.19) linking the rate of monetary growth to the nominal interest rate is immediately
obtained by combining (2.16), (2.11) and (2.18).
3. Solution Method and Calibration of the Model
3.1. The Transformed Model
In order to analyze the equilibrium of the economy we have to solve simultaneously the equilib-
rium equations we have stated at the end of the previous section. Since we are dealing with an
endogenous growth model, many variables are non-stationary. Therefore, we will work instead
with variables expressed in ratios. We deÞne ct as the consumption to current period capital
ratio and γt+1 as the gross rate of growth of capital per capita,
ct =
ct
kt
and γt+1 =
kt+1
kt
.
We redeÞne correspondingly the other variables as
yt =
yt
kt
, gt =
gt
kt
, mt =
Mt
pt kt
, ft+1 =
pt+1
pt
, λt = λtk
θ
t , and ηt = ηtk
θ
t ,
where yt, gt, mt, ft+1, λt and ηt are the output to capital ratio, government spending to capital
ratio, real balances to capital ratio, inßation rate, transformed marginal utility of wealth, and
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transformed marginal utility of real balances, respectively. After such a transformation, the
equilibrium conditions (2.17), (2.4), (2.3), (2.9), (2.18), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), (2.19), and (2.8)
become
ct + γt − (1− δ) + gt = yt, (3.1)
yt = Atg
1−α
t , (3.2)
ct = mt + st (1− τt) (yt − δ) , (3.3)
gt = τt (yt − δ) + (µt+1 − 1) mt, (3.4)
µt+1 =
mt+1
mt
γt+1ft+1, (3.5)
c−θt = λt + ηt, (3.6)
λt = βEt
Ã
λt+1 + ηt+1
ft+1
γ−θt+1
!
, (3.7)
λt = βEt
n
λt+1γ
−θ
t+1 {1 + (1− τt+1) [αyt+1 − δ]}+ ηt+1γ−θt+1st+1 (1− τt+1) [αyt+1 − δ]
o
,
(3.8)
λt
1 + it+1
= βEt
Ã
λt+1
ft+1
γ−θt+1
!
, (3.9)
and
gt = (AtG)
1/α , (3.10)
respectively. Due to the timing of events in our model, the cash-in-advance constraint (3.3)
could become non-binding for some realizations of the shocks. Several studies that take into
account analogous timing conclude that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding for almost all
shock realizations (see for example Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lucas, 1991; or Hromcova´, 2000).
Therefore, we write the cash-in-advance constraint with equality. However, we have checked in
all our simulations that the Lagrange multiplier ηt takes in fact always strictly positive values,
which means that the cash-in-advance is actually binding.
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3.2. Solution Method
The previous model does not admit a closed form solution and, therefore, we will use a numerical
solution method. The solution technique we will apply will be the one of Uhlig (1997), which is
based on the log-linearization of the necessary equations characterizing the equilibrium around
the steady state. Uhligs method uses the Euler equation to solve for the law of motion of the
recursive equilibrium. That law of motion is found by means of the undetermined coeﬃcients
method. The solution procedure is described in detail in the Appendix.
3.3. Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the quarterly US data for the period 1979:1-1997:2. We choose
this particular period, because it exhibits a stationary income velocity of M1, which allows us
to assume safely that money demand shocks are stationary .
We use a bar to denote the steady state value of a variable of the transformed model (3.1)−
(3.10). The stationary value γ¯ of the gross rate of growth is set to 1.00375.2 The value we choose
for the growth rate of the money supply is µ¯ = 1.015, which coincides with the empirical growth
rate of M1. The nominal interest rate i that corresponds to this growth rate of the money supply
is 0.02, which is computed using the equilibrium conditions at the steady state. The share of
capital in the production function is set equal to α = 0.36. We set the value of the depreciation
rate δ = 0.0085 in order to match the empirical averages of the ratios of consumption to output,
investment to output, and government spending to output. Taking into account that on average
the government spending represents 20% of the GDP, we choose for the steady state ratio g¯ of
government spending to capital a value that generates gt/ yt = 0.2. The resulting average level
of the income tax rate is the one that satisÞes the government budget constraint, which turns
out to be τ¯ = 0.232. The discount factor β is adjusted depending on the value of the parameter
characterizing the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution θ. For the benchmark
model we take θ = 1.2 and the corresponding discount factor is β = 0.995. To calibrate the
stochastic process of technology shocks, we calculate the Solow residuals using an analogous
procedure to that described in Cooley (1997). Thus, the technology parameters take the values
A¯ = 1, ρA = 0.9977, and σA = 0.00923. The parameter values for the eﬃciency of the payment
system are determined in a similar way. We use data of both consumption as a fraction of
GDP and money velocity in order to generate series for st using the cash-in-advance constraint.
Thus, we set s¯ = 0.66, ρs = 0.975, and σs = 0.0103. The benchmark parameter values are
summarized in Table 1.
2This value corresponds to the growth rate of GDP per worker.
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γ¯ = 1.00375
µ¯ = 1.015 or 1 + i¯ = 1.02 (=⇒ τ¯ = 0.232)
α = 0.36
δ = 0.0085
θ = 1.2, β = 0.995
A¯ = 1, ρA = 0.9977, σA = 0.00923
s¯ = 0.66, ρs = 0.975, σs = 0.0103
Table 1: Benchmark values of the parameters.
Using these parameters the model displays the following characteristics:
averages for: data calibration
government spending/output 0.2 0.2
consumption/output 0.65 0.59
investment/output 0.15 0.21
income velocity 6.79 6.5
Table 2: Comparison between empirical and calibrated values of some variables.
4. Steady State Analysis
We will analyze in this section the eﬀects of permanent shocks on the stationary equilibrium
of the non-stochastic version of the model for both targeting policies. To this end, we set
σA = σs = 0.
4.1. Steady State Eﬀects of both the Rate of Monetary Growth and the Nominal
Interest Rate
We will Þrst analyze the eﬀect of permanent changes of the rate of growth of money supply on
the stationary equilibrium of the economy. An increase in the growth rate of money translates
into more seignorage. This means that in order to keep the government spending to output
ratio constant, the tax rate on income decreases. Higher disposable income can be distributed
optimally between more consumption and more capital accumulation. Therefore, in our model,
an increase in the growth rate of money is growth enhancing. Note that equations (3.5) and
(3.9) become at a non-stochastic steady state
µ¯ = γ¯f¯ , (4.1)
and
1
1 + i¯
=
β (γ¯)−θ
f¯
,
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respectively. Combining the last two equations we obtain
µ¯ = (γ¯)1−θ (1 + i¯). (4.2)
Taking into account that the growth rate γ¯ reacts positively to an increase in µ¯ and that θ > 1, we
immediately obtain that the nominal interest rate increases with the rate of monetary growth.3
Therefore, the eﬀects of an increase in the rate µ¯ of monetary growth are equivalent to those of
an increase in the nominal interest rate i¯.
The eﬀect of an increase in the rate of monetary growth µ¯ (or of an equivalent increase in
the nominal interest rate i¯) on the stationary inßation rate f¯ depends on the size of the eﬀect
on the growth rate γ¯. If the increase in γ¯ does not outweigh the increase in µ¯, then inßation
increases (see (4.1)) .We can see in Figure 1 that this is the case for our calibrated model. The
reactions of both γ¯ and f¯ to changes in µ¯ and in i¯ are plotted in Figure 1.
(Insert Figure 1)
4.2. Steady State Eﬀects of Technology Changes
We want to characterize now the eﬀects of a change in the steady state level of the technology A¯
on the stationary values both of the growth rate and of the inßation rate. When the steady state
level of the technology increases, it has a positive eﬀect on the growth rate because a higher
value of A¯ corresponds to higher total factor productivity. The associated higher income level
permits to lower the tax rate, which implies in turn an increase in consumption. Agents increase
their demand for real balances and, therefore, we observe a decrease in the inßation rate for
both monetary policy instruments. These results are plotted in Figure 2.
(Insert Figure 2)
4.3. Steady State Eﬀects of Changes in the Eﬃciency of the Payment System
When the steady state level s¯ of the eﬃciency of the payment system increases, a higher fraction
of the individuals current period income can be used to purchase consumption goods. Therefore,
the relative demand for real monetary balances goes down, that is, m¯ decreases. This induces
a decrease in seignorage and, in order to fulÞll the government budget constraint, the tax rate
must increase. Lower disposable income implies a decrease in the growth rate of consumption
relative to capital, that is, c¯ decreases. Combining equations (3.1) , (3.2) and (3.10) we obtain
the following equation evaluated at the steady state:
c¯+ γ¯ − (1− δ) + ¡A¯G¢1/α = A¯1/α (G)(1−α)/α , (4.3)
3The positive association between the rate of monetary growth and the nominal interest rate is also found in
the standard model of capital accumulation with money in the utility function (Sidrauski, 1967). Note that if
θ < 1, the sign of the previous relation would be reversed.
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which tells us that the sum c¯ + γ¯ must remain constant. Therefore, as c¯ decreases, the rate of
economic growth γ¯ must increase.
Concerning the change in prices, the money market equilibrium condition (4.1) implies that,
when the growth rate µ¯ of money is Þxed and the rate γ¯ of economic growth increases, inßation
must drop. Moreover, under nominal interest rate targeting, the relationship between the sta-
tionary values of the nominal interest rate i¯ and the growth rate µ¯ of money supply, given in
equation (4.2), implies analogously that the inßation rate must decrease.
The behavior of the stationary growth rate γ¯ and the inßation rate f¯ for both monetary
policy instruments is plotted in Figure 3. Notice that the eﬀects turn out to be quantitatively
very small.
(Insert Figure 3)
5. Eﬀects of the Two Targeting Procedures on the Stochastic Equilibrium
5.1. Monetary Aggregate Targeting: Impulse-Responses
We consider here that the monetary policy consists of pegging a constant monetary growth rate,
µt = µ for all periods. We solve the system (3.1)-(3.10) using the numerical technique described
in section 3.2 and in the Appendix. The log-linearized equations and the matrices of endogenous
state variables, control variables, and exogenous state variables can be found in the Appendix.
To see the eﬀect of each shock we will consider a reaction of the economy to a technology
shock and to a money demand shock separately. We will assume that the economy is in the
non-stochastic steady state at time t = 0. At time t = 1 the perturbation εA,t (εs,t) is selected
in such a way that the technology shock (the money demand shock) experiences a 1% deviation
from its steady state. These perturbations become εA,t = 0 and εs,t = 0, respectively, for
all t > 1. In Figures 4 and 5 we plot the impulse-responses to a technology and to a money
demand shock, respectively, for the following variables: growth rate of capital, output to capital
ratio, consumption to capital ratio, real balances to capital ratio, the inßation rate, the nominal
interest rate, and the tax rate. We concentrate our analysis on the eﬀects on economic growth
and inßation rates.
(Insert Figures 4 and 5)
A positive transitory technology shock increases output directly. Taxable income increases
and hence the tax rate can be reduced. This results in higher disposable income for both con-
sumption purchases and capital accumulation so that the growth rate γt of the economy increases
in the short run. Since consumption also increases, the demand for real balances increases too.
However, since the growth rate of nominal balances is Þxed, we observe a temporary decrease
of the inßation rate in order to clear the money market.
A positive transitory money demand shock relaxes the liquidity constraint and, therefore,
the value of money will be lower. This implies lower seignorage and a higher tax rate. However,
as the payment system will become more ineﬃcient, future tax rates will be lower. This means
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that the sequence of future growth rates must increase over time, which is only possible if the
rate of growth γt goes down in the short run. Since the rate of monetary growth is Þxed, the
reduction in the (adjusted) monetary balances is achieved exclusively through a change in prices.
This amounts to a reduction in the rate ft of inßation in the short run.
5.2. Nominal Interest Rate Targeting: Impulse-Responses
We assume now that the monetary policy consists on pegging a constant nominal interest rate,
it = i for all periods. In order to keep Þxed the nominal interest rate, the government must let
the money supply respond to both technology and money demand shocks. The log-linearized
equations and the vectors of state and control variables are similar to those corresponding to
the monetary aggregate targeting case. These equations can be found in the Appendix. To see
the eﬀect of each shock separately on the growth rate and on the inßation rate, we also analyze
the corresponding impulse-responses.
A positive transitory technology shock increases current output and, consequently, it also
increases consumption and capital accumulation. Such an increase of the growth rate γt must
be accompanied by an instantaneous reduction in the inßation rate ft so as to increase real
monetary balances. This increase of real balances is required to purchase a larger amount of
consumption.
A positive transitory money demand shock implies a decrease in the demand for real balances.
The supply of money reacts endogenously in such a way that seignorage actually increases.
Therefore, the current tax rate turns out to be lower than future tax rates. This means that
the sequence of future growth rates must decrease over time, which is only possible if the rate
γt of growth goes up in the short run. As the payment system will become less eﬃcient in the
future, future prices will be lower than the current ones in relative terms, and we observe thus
a reduction in the inßation rate ft in the short run.
Impulse-responses of the diﬀerent variables of our model to technology and money demand
shocks are plotted in Figures 4 and 5.
5.3. Comparison of the Two Targeting Procedures
In this section we compare the performance of the two targeting procedures from the point
of view of the volatilities of some relevant endogenous variables. We also make some welfare
considerations.
5.3.1. Fluctuations
Technology and money demand shocks aﬀect the behavior of all variables through diﬀerent
channels under either monetary aggregate targeting or nominal interest rate targeting. We
will analyze the induced volatilities on consumption, on the economic growth rate, and on the
inßation rate. Moreover, we will evaluate the contribution of technology and money demand
shocks to the total volatility of these variables. We perform the analysis for diﬀerent values of
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the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We deÞne the volatility σh of a variable ht as the
standard error of the second moment of the logarithm of the Hodrick-Prescott Þltered series.
The simulated series have a length of 150 quarters and the volatilities σh reported in our tables
are obtained by averaging over 500 shock realizations. We evaluate three cases: when the origin
of disturbances are both technology and money demand shocks, only technology shocks, and
only money demand shocks, respectively.
As can be seen from Table 3, the rate of economic growth γt is less volatile under nominal
interest rate targeting for values of θ < 1, and under monetary aggregate targeting for θ > 1.
The same holds for consumption volatility when only technology shocks or both kinds of shocks
operate. When the only source of disturbances comes from money demand shocks, consumption
is less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting for all values of θ under consideration.
Nevertheless, the diﬀerences are very small and the conÞdence intervals overlap. This means that
we cannot clearly say which of the two targeting procedures delivers a less volatile consumption
or a less volatile growth rate. The situation is diﬀerent when we look at the inßation rate ft,
since this rate is clearly less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting whenever only money
demand shocks or both kinds of shocks operate.
The reason for which we do not observe large diﬀerences in the ßuctuations of consumption
and of the growth rate lies in the fact that their volatility is mostly driven by technology shocks.
As we have seen in our impulse-response analysis, technology shocks aﬀect the economy in a
very similar manner under both targeting procedures.
When we consider the volatility of the inßation rate, we have to look at the behavior of
real balances. Even if real balances react to shocks in a similar way under both targeting
procedures, the adjustment of nominal balances, and thus of prices, is quite diﬀerent. We
observe that under monetary aggregate targeting, money demand shocks are the ones that
contribute more signiÞcantly to the volatility of the inßation rate. However, under nominal
interest rate targeting, ßuctuations of the inßation rate are mostly driven by technology shocks.
Under monetary aggregate targeting all the adjustment of real balances to shocks comes through
changes in prices. Under nominal interest rate targeting, nominal balances react to a technology
shock in an opposite direction than real balances, and hence the inßation rate turns out to be
more volatile. However, nominal and real balances adjust in the same direction when a money
demand shock occurs, and we observe almost negligible ßuctuations of the inßation rate.
5.3.2. Welfare
When the government cares about the welfare of the representative agent, its objective should
be to maximize the following welfare function:
W = Et
 ∞X
j=t
βj−t
c1−θj − 1
1− θ
 . (5.1)
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To ensure that the expectation in (5.1) is Þnite, we write the consumption as
ct = c
∗
t γ¯
t,
where c∗t is the detrended consumption, and rewrite the welfare function as
W = Et
 ∞X
j=t
(β∗)j−t
³
c∗j
´1−θ
1− θ −
βj−t
1− θ


where β∗ = βγ¯1−θ be strictly less than 1 so as to ensure the desired convergence. Such an
inequality is satisÞed by our calibrated model. We calculate the welfare as an empirical mean
of 500 shock realizations of time series with a horizon of 800 periods.
We again let the origin of disturbances be both technology shocks and money demand shocks,
only technology shocks, and only money demand shocks. As can be seen from Table 4, in most
of the cases the average level of welfare is higher under nominal interest rate targeting. Notice,
that the conÞdence intervals under the two targeting procedures almost completely overlap.
Therefore, we are unable to choose the monetary policy instrument that would clearly lead
to a welfare improvement. This result conÞrms the fact that the diﬀerences in ßuctuations
of consumption under the two targeting procedures are too small to generate some signiÞcant
diﬀerences in the associated welfare levels.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the eﬀects of two targeting procedures of monetary policy. We
have performed two kinds of analyses: the one concerning the non-stochastic version of the econ-
omy and the one concerning to its stochastic counterpart. In a non-stochastic economy we have
seen the eﬀects of permanent changes in technology and in the eﬃciency of the payment system
(the money demand) on the stationary values of growth and inßation rates. In a stochastic
economy we have studied how the endogenous variables react to unexpected transitory shocks.
Moreover, we have shown the contribution of those two particular shocks to the ßuctuations of
the growth rate, of the inßation rate, and of consumption.
The non-stochastic economy and the stochastic economy (both in the short and in the long
run) behave similarly when taking into account the shocks in the technology regardless of whether
they are permanent or transitory. This is not the case when we consider changes in the eﬃciency
of the payment system. The basic diﬀerence we observe is that a transitory positive money
demand shock makes the rate of economic growth fall in the short run, whereas this rate is
permanently increased by a permanent positive money demand shock. This discrepancy is
caused by the diﬀerent future value of money when changes are transitory or permanent. When
a positive transitory shock aﬀects the eﬃciency of the payment system, the value of money
experiences a decrease and it comes back to its original level. Nevertheless, when a permanent
increase in the eﬃciency of the payment system occurs, the future value of money decreases
permanently.
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Concerning the comparison of the two targeting procedures with respect to ßuctuations, we
Þnd that the inßation rate is less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning
the volatility of consumption and the growth rate, our model delivers statistically equivalent
results for both targeting procedures. The same holds for our welfare analysis: none of the two
targets is clearly superior if the goal of the government is to maximize the individuals expected
lifetime utility. Therefore, our results coincide with those of Poole (1970) and Collard, Dellas
and Ertz (1998) when we analyze the performance of nominal interest rate targeting as a price
stabilizing policy. The welfare analysis delivers similar results as Canzoneri and Dellas (1998),
who conclude that it is not clear which policy performs better in terms of welfare. Therefore,
our model suggests that the welfare and the stability of either consumption or growth rates do
not depend much on the choice of the monetary policy targeting procedure. If the goal of the
monetary authority is to stabilize the inßation rate, the choice of the nominal interest rate as
the monetary policy instrument seems appropriate.
We have studied the behavior of the economy for passive monetary policies.4 An analysis that
remains to be done is to evaluate the performance of the economy under active monetary policies.
This amounts to analyzing how should the monetary authorities react to current disturbances
in both the technology and the eﬃciency of the payment system in order to stabilize the growth
rate or to achieve higher welfare, when they face the choice of controlling either the monetary
aggregates or the nominal interest rates.
4A passive monetary policy is understood as the one that follows a target that is Þxed for all periods, i.e.,
either constant money growth rate or constant nominal interest rate. An active monetary policy would be a
function of past disturbance realizations.
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Appendix
Applying the Solution Method
To solve the system of equilibrium equations (3.1)-(3.10) we proceed as follows:
1) We assign values to parameters and calculate the steady state (expressed in ratios). To
this end, we must Þrst rewrite the equilibrium equations of the transformed model (3.1)-(3.10)
in a non-stochastic steady state (with σA = σs = 0) as follows:
c¯+ γ¯ − (1− δ) + g¯ = y¯,
y¯ = A¯g¯1−α,
c¯ = m¯+ s¯(1− τ¯) (y¯ − δ) ,
g¯ = τ¯ (y¯ − δ) + (µ¯− 1)m¯,
µ¯ = γ¯f¯ ,
(c¯)−θ = λ¯+ η¯
λ¯ =
βγ¯−θ
f¯
¡
λ¯+ η¯
¢
,
1 = βγ¯−θ
½
(1− τ¯) (αy¯ − δ)
·
1 + s¯
η¯
λ¯
¸
+ 1
¾
,
1
1 + i
=
βγ¯−θ
f¯
,
g¯ =
¡
A¯G
¢1/α
.
where the variables with a bar denote their steady state values.
2) We log-linearize the system of equilibrium equations (3.1)-(3.10) around its steady state.
A variable with a tilde denotes the log-deviation of such a variable from its steady state, that is,
ht = ln ht − ln h¯,
17
where ht is the original variable and h¯ is its steady state value. The log-linearization of the
system (3.1)-(3.10) can be written in the following way:5
−c¯ct − γ¯γt+1 − g¯gt + y¯yt = 0,
−yt + At + (1− α) gt = 0,
−c¯ct + m¯ mt + s¯ (y¯ − δ) (1− τ¯) st + s¯y¯ (1− τ¯) yt − s¯τ¯ (y¯ − δ) τt = 0,
−g¯gt + τ¯ (y¯ − δ) τt + τ¯ y¯yt + (µ¯− 1) m¯ mt + µ¯m¯µt+1 = 0,
Et
³
− mt+1 − γt+1 − ft+1 + µt+1 + mt
´
= 0,
θc¯−θct + λ¯λt + η¯ηt = 0,
Et
Ã
βγ¯−θ
f¯
λt+1 +
βγ¯−θ
f¯
η¯
λ¯
ηt+1 − θγt+1 − λt − ft+1
!
= 0,
Et
µ
βγ¯−θ [1 + (1− τ¯) (αy¯ − δ)] λt+1 + βγ¯−θ
·
(1− τ¯)αy¯
µ
1 + s¯
η¯
λ¯
¶¸
yt+1 +
βγ¯−θ
η¯
λ¯
s¯ (1− τ¯) (αy¯ − δ) {ηt+1 + st+1}− βγ¯−θτ¯ (αy¯ − δ)
µ
1 + s¯
η¯
λ¯
¶
τt+1 − θγt+1 − λt
¶
= 0,
Et
Ã
λt+1 − θγt+1 − λt − ft+1 + βγ¯
−θ
f¯
ieit+1
!
= 0,
−gt + 1
α
At = 0.
It is now convenient to write the log-linearized system of equilibrium equations in a matrix
form. To do so, we deÞne xt as a q−dimensional vector of endogenous state variables, ut as a
n−dimensional vector of control variables, and et as a d−dimensional vector of exogenous state
5When the monetary aggregate targeting is employed, µt+1 = µ for all t, and thus µt+1 = 0. On the other
hand, when the nominal interet rate is targeted, it+1 = i for all t and thus õt+1 = 0.
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variables. We can then write
Axt +Bxt−1 + Cut +Det = 0,
Et (F xt+1 +Gxt +Hxt−1 + Jut+1 +Kut + Let+1 +Met) = 0,
et+1 = Net + εt+1, with Et(εt+1) = 0,
where it is assumed that C is of dimension l× n, with l ≥ n and rank(C) = n, l is the number
of deterministic equations, F is of dimension (q + n− l)× q, and N is of dimension d× d.
If we consider our original model, there are two endogenous state variables, kt, andMt, eight
control variables, ct, λt, ηt, yt, pt, τt, gt, and it+1 or µt+1, depending on the monetary policy, and
two exogenous state variables, At and st. We thus have l = 6 deterministic equations and n = 8
control variables. However, the matrix C is properly deÞned for l ≥ n. Therefore, we reduce n
by redeÞning some endogenous control variables as state variables in order to have n = l = 6.
Obviously, we have that q = 4 and d = 2. For the monetary aggregate targeting policy we will
consider the following vector of endogenous state variables:
xt =
³
γt+1, eit+1, ηt, ft+1 ´0 .
For the nominal interest rate targeting policy the vector xt is instead
xt =
³
γt+1, µt+1, ηt, ft+1
´0
.
The vectors of control and exogenous state variables are the same for both targeting procedures
ut =
³
ct, λt, yt, mt, τt, gt
´0
,
and
et =
³
At, st
´0
.
3) We obtain the recursive equilibrium law of motion in the form
xt = Pxt−1 +Qet,
ut = Rxt−1 + Set,
where the algorithm looks for matrices P,Q,R and S so that the equilibrium described by these
equations is stable. Uhlig (1997) proves that P is the solution of the following quadratic matrix
equation
ΨP2 − ΓP−Θ = 0,
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where
Ψ = F − JC−1A,
Γ = JC−1B −G+KC−1A,
Θ = KC−1B −H.
The matrix R is given by
R = −C−1 (AP+B) ,
The matrix Q satisÞes³
N 0 ⊗
³
F − JC−1A
´
+ Ir ⊗
³
JR+ FP+G−KC−1A
´´
vec (Q) =
vec
³³
JC−1D − L
´
N +KC−1D −M
´
,
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product, Id is the identity matrix of size d × d, and vec(·) denotes
columnwise vectorization. Finally, S is given by
S = −C−1 (AQ+D) .
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σc
θ
0.5
0.9
1
1.2
1.5
µt = µ for all t
(A, s)
× 1e− 3
(A)
× 1e− 3
(s)
× 1e− 3
25.3
(20.7,29.9)
23.9
(20.6,27.2)
5.11
(1.6,8.6)
39.95
(32.5,47.3)
37.73
(32.4,43)
8.02
(2.2,13.8)
41.82
(34.1,49.5)
39.497
(33.9,45)
8.4
(2.3,14.5)
44.65
(36.3,52.9)
42.16
(36.4,52.9)
8.96
(2.4,15.5)
47.4
(38.6,56.3)
44.83
(38.5,51.2)
9.538
(2.5,16.5)
it = i for all t
(A, s)
× 1e− 3
(A)
× 1e− 3
(s)
× 1e− 3
24.8
(24.8,29.3)
23.5
(20.2,26.8)
4.87
(1.3,8.4)
39.91
(32.5,47.2)
37.7
(32.4,43)
7.98
(2.1,13.8)
41.81
(34.1,49.5)
39.493
(33.9,45)
8.36
(2.2,14.5)
44.67
(36.4,52.9)
42.18
(36.2,48.1)
8.95
(38.5,51.2)
47.5
(38.7,56.3)
44.88
(38.5,51.2)
9.534
(2.5,16.5)
σγ
0.5
0.9
1
1.2
1.5
29.847
(23.1,36.6)
27.54
(23.2,31.8)
7.197
(1.9,12.5)
30.102
(23.2,36.9)
27.7573
(23.3,32.1)
7.2954
(1.9,12.6)
30.1351
(23.2,37)
27.78
(23.3,32.2)
7.3079
(1.9,12.6)
30.1845
(23.2,37)
27.8265
(23.4,32.24)
7.3266
(1.9,12.7)
30.234
(23.3,37)
27.868
(23.4,32.3)
7.3454
(1.9,12.7)
29.839
(23.1,36.6)
27.53
(23.2,31.8)
7.194
(1.9,12.5)
30.101
(23.2,36.9)
27.7569
(23.3,32.1)
7.2953
(1.9,12.6)
30.1348
(23.2,37)
27.78
(23.3,32.2)
7.3079
(1.9,12.6)
30.1848
(23.2,37)
27.8269
(23.4,32.24)
7.3268
(1.9,12.7)
30.235
(23.3,37)
27.869
(23.4,32.3)
7.3458
(1.9,12.7)
σf
0.5
0.9
1
1.2
1.5
1.57
(1.3,1.8)
1.25
(1,1.4)
0.904
(0.7,1)
1.15
(0.98,1.3)
0.678
(0.56,0.79)
0.913
(0.79,1)
1.1
(0.95,1.2)
0.6
(0.5,0.7)
0.917
(0.79,1)
1.05
(0.91,1.2)
0.5
(0.4,0.6)
0.923
(0.8,1)
0.98
(0.85,1.1)
0.491
(0.41,0.56)
0.855
(0.73,0.97)
0.6050
(0.49,0.72)
0.5710
(0.489,0.65)
0.1218
(0.032,0.21)
0.6055
(0.49,0.72)
0.5715
(0.489,0.65)
0.1219
(0.032,0.21)
0.6055
(0.49,0.72)
0.5716
(0.489,0.65)
0.1219
(0.032,0.21)
0.6056
(0.49,0.72)
0.5716
(0.489,0.65)
0.1219
(0.032,0.21)
0.6057
(0.49,0.72)
0.5717
(0.489,0.65)
0.1219
(0.032,0.21)
Table 3: Volatility of consumption, of the growth rate, and of the inßation rate for the two
targeting procedures (conÞdence intervals in brackets);6 µ = monetary growth rate, i = nominal
interest rate, θ = inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, (A, s) = both shocks
operate, (A) = only technology shocks operate, (s) = only money demand shocks operate, σc =
volatility of consumption, σγ = volatility of the rate of economic growth, σf = volatility of the
inßation rate.
6All reported volatilities must be multiplied by 1e− 3.
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θ0.5
0.9
1
1.2
1.5
µt = µ for all t
(A, s) (A) (s)
147.4
(−526,821)
147.3
(−524,819)
−62.58
(−63.1,−62.0)
−55.42
(−179,68.4)
−55.39
(−179,68.5)
−77.27
(−77.7,−76.7)
−69.55
(−197,58.6)
−69.526
(−197,58.6)
−81.27
(−81.78,−80.76)
−98.16
(−253,57)
−98.13
(−253,57)
−89.46
(−90,−88.9)
−157.16
(−429,115)
−157.12
(−429,115)
−101.42
(−102,−100.8)
it = i for all t
(A, s) (A) (s)
156
(−555,868)
156
(−555,868)
−62.55
(−62.6,−62.5)
−55.35
(−179,68.6)
−55.36
(−179,68.6)
−77.24
(−77.3,−77.2)
−69.52
(−197,58.6)
−69.524
(−197,58.6)
−81.24
(−81.28,−81.19)
−98.09
(−253,57)
−98.09
(−253,57)
−89.43
(−89.48,−89.38)
−156.82
(−428,114)
−156.82
(−428,114)
−101.38
(−101,−101.3)
Table 4: Welfare levels achieved under the two targeting procedures (conÞdence intervals in
brackets); µ = monetary growth rate, i = nominal interest rate, θ = inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, (A, s) = both shocks operate, (A) = only technology shocks operate,
(s) = only money demand shocks operate.
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Figure 1: Steady state eﬀects of the growth rate of money supply on the rate of economic growth
and on the inßation rate.
25
Figure 2: Steady state eﬀects of the technology on the rate of economic growth and on the
inßation rate.
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Figure 3: Steady state eﬀects of the eﬃciency of the payment system on the rate of economic
growth and the inßation rate.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of several variables to a shock in technology, under monetary ag-
gregate targeting (left column), and under nominal interest rate targeting (right column).
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of several variables to a shock in money demand, under monetary
aggregate targeting (left column), and under nominal interest rate targeting (right column).
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